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Humanist Ethics and Political Justice:
Soto, Sepúlveda, and the "Affair of the Indies'
Scott Davis

Abstract
In the debate over Spanish treatment of the natives of the New World, both
sides regularly invoked Aristotle on natural slaves. This paper argues
that the interpretation of the Spanish Dominican Domingo de Soto displays a
greater understanding of Aristotle and the Aristotelian tradition of
justice than that of Juan Gines de Sepúlveda, the Spanish Humanist. The
paper goes on to argue that it is the humanist tradition itself that
disposes Sepúlveda to misconstrue Aristotle and the tradition of political
justice.

In early July 1550, Domingo de Soto was called to Valladolid to discuss
the recent work of Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda. He apparently responded on the
15th asking to be excused from this task, for on August 4th Maximillian,
regent in the absence of Charles V, wrote back that "I entreat you and order
that you subsequently go about preparing to come here at the appointed time,
for which I will be grateful to you."2 Soto obliged. He could hardly do
otherwise. Soto was generally recognized as the inheritor of Francisco de
Vitoria's mantle as principal moral theologian of Spain. Not only would his
major work follow scrupulously the order of Vitoria's unpublished
commentaries, where the two overlapped, but where Vitoria was clipped and
allusive Soto amplified and completed the structure of the argument. Soto
goes beyond both Thomas and Vitoria, for example, to provide an
Aristotelian account of how "law even as punitive brings men to good."3
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Soto here exemplifies what it meant to be the successor to Vitoria. The
tradition of the "second scholastic" maintains an explicitly Aristotelian Thomism
in which ethics is understood in terms of the virtues, both natural and infused,
which taken together shape the Christian into an agent who acts both selfconsciously and in good conscience on behalf of the common good. This comes
out with particular clarity in the way the tradition relates justice to law. Though
law is crucial to establishing justice, it cannot be understood apart from prudent
interpretation directed toward equity, what the tradition, from Aristotle to Thomas
to Soto, calls epieikeia. In the Ethics, Aristotle distinguishes natural from legal
justice and goes on to argue that "the equitable," epiekeia, "is better than one kind
of justice," even though the equitable simply is just. "What creates the problem,"
he explains, " is that the equitable is just, but not the legally just but a correction of
legal justice."4 As T. C. O'Brien, following Gauthier, puts it, "Aristotle does not
define epieikeia as indulgence or mitigation; it is not outside the sphere of justice,
but is the source for accomplishing a higher form of the just, the naturally just."5
This is the vision of justice adopted, according to O'Brien, by Aquinas and
embraced by Vitoria and Soto. For Thomas and the Spanish Dominicans,
epieikeia is the virtue by which we pursue justice in those circumstances for
which the generality of the law cannot provide.6
Epiekeia figured prominently in Vitoria's analysis of the "affair of the
Indies."7 In assessing the justice of Spanish conquests in the New World, Vitoria
first asked what, if any, natural law rights the Spaniards possessed. Having
isolated those rights, he considered whether they had been exercised in good faith,
and concluded that, when viewed in their particulars, the conquests had been
carried out unjustly and to the detriment of the faith. The fact that there existed
recognized legal authorities claiming to underwrite the conquest did not excuse
either the crown or the leaders of the conquest from the reasonable exercise of
virtue on behalf of equity. As Vitoria wrote, virtuous agents '*must always be
prepared to forego some part of their rights rather than risk trespassing on some
unlawful thing."8 These conclusions brought Vitoria into conflict with the king
and the encomenderos of the New World, who feared intervention in their
exploitation of the natives and their land. Vitoria's conclusions, particularly as
expounded by Bartolomé de Las Casas, also provoked the ire of the humanist
Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda.
Born around 1490, Sepúlveda studied at the University of Alcalá before
moving to Bologna in 1515. There he studied with Pietro Pomponazzi, from
whom he "imbibed his love of Aristotle."9 During his time in Bologna, Sepúlveda
also became associated with the circle of Alberto Pio, Prince of Carpi, a noted
patron of Aristotelian studies.10 Sepúlveda remained with Pio until the prince's
death.11 But Sepúlveda was not only a student of Aristotle, he was also a skilled
polemicist. In 1529 he published an exhortation to the emperor Charles V to
undertake war against the Ottoman Turks, invoking "the necessity to fight for the
fatherland, for the hearth, and finally, for our salvation and liberty and for the true
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religion." Basing himself on biblical and classical authors, Sepúlveda extols the
justice of making war on the Turks, entreats Charles to put an end to wars
between Christians, and asks rhetorically "why, oh Caesar, do you not rise up and
go forth promptly down the road that God and destiny show you toward the
greatest undertakings and ultimately lordship of the terrestrial orb?"13 In
recapturing Jerusalem, he concludes, Charles will be carrying out the highest
Christian duty and "let the rest of the world unite under the rule of Christians and
your most holy religion."14
Two years later Sepúlveda spent some time in Rome at the College of Saint
Clement, where he noticed among the noble Spanish students "some who were of
the erroneous opinion that a good soldier could not simultaneously maintain the
requirements of the military life and the precepts of the Christian religion."15 This
led to his first Démocrates or On the Conformity of Military Discipline and the
Christian Religion}6 In this dialogue, Démocrates labors at great length to prove
that there is no conflict between faith and the practice of arms.
In 1535 Charles V made him his official chronicler and Sepúlveda returned to
Spain with Charles the following year. In 1541 the Emperor appointed him tutor
in history and geography to Prince Philip, though Sepúlveda apparently had no
more success than his fellow humanists in making a scholar out of the future
Emperor.17 Within a few years, Sepúlveda applied to publish a second
Démocrates, occasioned by the attacks on Spanish rule in the New World, not
only by Protestant propagandists but also by the indefatigable Dominican
Bartolomé de Las Casas. In his prologue, addressed to Luiz de Mendoza,
Sepúlveda insists that:
Whether the war by which the Kings of Spain and our compatriots have
subdued and continue to subdue to our dominion the barbarous peoples
who live in the western and southern regions, commonly called Indians
in Spanish, is just or injust, and by what justification empire may be
established over these peoples is an overarching question.18
The urgency Sepúlveda felt about justifying the crown and its conquests rapidly
developed into an acrimonious dispute over the dialogue's publication. By
September of 1549 Sepúlveda was writing Prince Philip, his sometime student,
encouraging him to read Aristotle and the Latin and Greek historians, and alerting
him to the, "scandalous and diabolical" writings of Las Casas, and of his duty not
to give way to 'Yeckless men who would obscure the truth with lies and
subterfuges, particularly in a matter pertaining so closely to the public good and
the reputation and conscience of your fathers and uncles."19
And so it came about that Soto, along with Melchor Cano, Bartolomé de
Miranda, Bernardino de Arévalo and members of the King's Councils, was to
consider the justice of Spanish behavior in the New World as defended by
Sepúlveda. Although represented as a "debate", Sepúlveda and Las Casas did not
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square off against each other. Sepúlveda appeared to defend his work on the first
day, while Las Casas arrived the following day with a comprehensive text in
rebuttal. After much discussion the assembly adjourned until January 20 of 1551.
After much negotiation they finally met in May of 1551, but no official finding
was ever issued. The practical upshot was that Sepulveda did not secure
permission to publish.20
The dialogue itself opens with Démocrates and Leopold, his German
protagonist from the earlier dialogue, taking their ease in the gardens by the banks
of the Pisguera, in northern Spain. While spending "a few days with some friends
at the Palace of Prince Philip," remarks Leopold, Fernán Cortés, Marqués del
Valle, passed through,"21 and Leopold and his friends fell into conversation about
the justice of Spanish behavior in the Indies. Démocrates, not a little put out by
Leopold's obtuseness, embarks on an account of the natural law and justice in
war. The first principle of the natural law, he explains, is "the rejection of evil and
the choice of the good, from which no one can claim any excuse."22 This natural
law is written by God on the rational soul and philosophers agree that it "has the
same force everywhere, whether acknowledged or not."23 In the matter of war,
justice requires not only cause, but authority and right intention, as well as
rectitude in its execution.24
While this would seem to follow the analysis of Thomas and Vitoria, the
account begins to shift when Démocrates takes up the types of cause considered
just for initiating war. The first, not surprisingly, is self defense, but in arguing this
point Sepúlveda grounds it not in the just use of minimal force, in the manner of
Aquinas, but rather in nature, which:
. . . armed the rest of the animals with claws, horns, teeth, hooves and
other defenses, and prepared man for every sort of war by giving him
hands, which substitute for claws, horns, and hooves, in as much as the
hand can use a sword and lance and any other sort of weapon.25
While Sepúlveda refers to Aristotle,26 this passage bears a notable resemblance to
Cicero's De Officiis, 1,4:
Nature has endowed every species of living creature with the instinct of
self-preservation, of avoiding what seems likely to cause injury to life or
limb, and of procuring and providing everything needful for life.27
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Cicero goes on immediately to remark that man:
is endowed with reason, by which he comprehends the chain of
consequences, perceives the cause of things, understands the relation of
cause to effect and of effect to cause, draws analogies, and connects and
associates the present and the future—easily surveys the course of his
whole life and makes the necessary preparations for its conduct.28
The importance of establishing the Ciceronian background here is crucial. There
are multiple accounts of "natural law" at work in the Middle Ages and the
Renaissance. That Sepúlveda cites Aristotle and Aquinas does not necessarily
imply that his view of natural law is theirs, or that his arguments bear any strong
semblance to theirs. This will prove particularly important when looking at the
justice of conquest.
The status of Cicero had been a rallying point for the earliest humanists. His
language and arguments had become the mother's milk of humanist education.
The demand for a "Ciceronian" standard in Latin had erupted into an international
controversy in the 1520s.29 It is not surprising, then, that Cicero's distinctively
Roman account of the just war informed humanist thought. Cicero, a few chapters
after his contrast of men and beasts, insists that "the only excuse, therefore, for
going to war is that we may live in peace unharmed," adding that "no war is just,
unless it is entered upon after an official demand for satisfaction has been
submitted or a warning has been given and a formal declaration made."30
Furthermore, while Cicero's Republic was not available to the mid-sixteenth
century, important passages were preserved in school authors such as Isidore, who
records Cicero's remarks that "those wars are unjust which are undertaken
without provocation. For only a war waged for revenge or defense can actually be
just," and that "no war is considered just unless it has been proclaimed and
declared, or unless reparation has first been demanded,"31 and Nonnius, who
repeats Cicero's judgment that "our people by defending their allies have gained
dominion over the whole world."32
As late as April of 1546 Sepúlveda wrote to Sebastián León that "I will never
repent having taken Cicero as a model, as well as Quintillian."33 Early in
Démocrates Secundus, Sepúlveda remarks that "Isidore denies that a war is just
which has not been formally declared."34 Démocrates continues that "a second
justifying cause for war consists in the recovery of plundered goods," going on to
note that Abraham's aid to Lot shows that "it is just to make war not only to
recover our own property, but that of our friends as well and to repelí attacks
made on them."35 His third class of just cause is by way of punishment, so that the
offenders, "in receiving the merited punishment, learn by example for the future
and everyone else takes fear through their example."36 Distinctive in this third
class is that such punishment and deterrence,frequentlyundertaken by the Greeks
and Romans, carries with it "the unanimous approbation of the nations, whose
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shared sentiments are considered the law of nature," which Sepúlveda almost
immediately describes as the "ius gentium."37 To Démocrates' appropriation of
the right to punish, Leopold objects that vengeance "is exclusively the right of
God," but Démocrates dismisses this objection and reasserts that these three are
the justifying causes listed by Isidore and recorded in Ecclesiastical decree. The
Ciceronian background is clear to see.
But at this point Sepúlveda makes a radical move, invoking Aristotle on
natural slavery and connecting it explicitly to the affair of the Indies. Démocrates,
considering the less common justifications for war, insists that they:
nonetheless, are held to be thoroughly just and based in natural and
divine law. One of these, the most applicable to those barbarians
vulgarly called Indians, whose defense you seem to have taken up, is as
follows: That those whose natural condition is such that they must obey
others, if they refuse that lordship and there is no other recourse, may be
subdued by arms; and that this war is just according to the opinion of the
most eminent philosophers.38
In the face of Leopold's exclamation that this is an outlandish doctrine, well
removed from common opinion, Démocrates insists that it is only alien to those
with a shadowy grasp of philosophy; it is, rather, "an ancient doctrine among the
philosophers and thoroughly consistent with the natural law." Sepulveda's
justification for these claims is his work on Aristotle's Politics, of which he
published a translation in 1546.39 Based on his own interpretation of Aristotle, the
humanist moves to bypass the received tradition and return to a more pristine
philosophical foundation, unsullied by the confusions of the scholastics. He
begins with the claim that the various forms of dominion may all be traced back
to "a single principle and natural doctrine: The lordship and dominion of the
perfect over the imperfect, of the strong over the weak, of preeminent virtue over
vice."40 That the native Americans are a degenerate human form, defective not
simply with regard to individuals, but as a whole, Sepúlveda takes as evident.
Given that they are so substantially underdeveloped, it is a matter of natural
justice that they come under the tutelage of superior peoples such as the Spanish.
Sepúlveda distinguishes between what is done in a nation and what is
countenanced by the law and moral order of the people.41 Invoking Aristotle, he
argues that "the conduct of a nation is understood to be constituted by the public
acts through which they maintain public order with full authority."42 The defect of
the native Americans lies not simply in individual infractions of the natural law,
but in the fact that they constitute "a city so barbarous and inhumane that it does
not include among moral evils the crimes I have enumerated and does not
condemn them in its laws or morals."43 It is the very constitution of this
community that is corrupt and corrupting, and so it is appropriate that such a city
be suppressed by the civilized communities of the world.
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This, according to Démocrates, demonstrates the so-called Indians to be
Aristotle's natural slaves. Their failure to acknowledge the most basic forms of
decency suggests that they lack the natural reason that we recognize as essential to
the right ordering of material life. Just as we see "with clarity that it is natural and
beneficial that the soul rules the body,"44 so we recognize in peoples that:
there is one class in which some are naturally rulers and other naturally
slaves. Those who excel in prudence and talent, although not physically
robust, are lords by nature; on the other hand, those who are slow and
dull of understanding, although physically vigorous in finishing their
necessary tasks, are natural slaves, for whom, they [philosophers] add, it
is not only just but helpful that they serve the natural lords.45
This is only fitting, since their masters will make it possible for the defective to
abide by the natural law and develop a lifestyle that is more humane and virtuous.
And this, finally, is why:
rule must always rest in the power of the better and more prudent, since,
as the philosophers teach, rulers who are true rulers are always guided
by the better and more prudent governance, sensitive at every moment
to the good of the community.46
Consequently, it would be a dereliction of duty, once their true state has been
discovered, for the Spanish, as emissaries of a more developed humanity, to leave
the native Americans to their own devices.
By the time Sepúlveda wrote, the impact of the conquests on the native
peoples was a matter of public knowledge. Thus Leopold objects that "in this war
against the barbarians there is considerable devastation and loss of life," and he
goes on to worry that "this war against the barbarians, according to what I have
heard, is not carried out with right intention, since they enter into them with no
other goal than acquiring great amounts of gold and silver, by licit and illicit
methods."47 Démocrates responds in two steps. First, as St. Augustine argues, the
real evil of war is not death, since everybody must die. And while it is true that
greed and the desire for gain are among the real evils of war, "if wicked and
unjust men commit crimes and acts of avarice and cruelty, as I have heard has
happened on many occasions, this does not invalidate the cause defended by the
prince and other honorable persons."48 There is a distinction to be made, in other
words, between the legitimate ius ad bellum provided by the barbarity of the
Indians, and the failures of ius in bello perpetrated by the conquistadors as the
instruments of the legitimate authorities. The evil done is perpetrated by the
conquistadors as private citizens and, while regrettable, not relevant to the just
claim provided by the natural slavery of the Indians.
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There are two distinct questions to be asked of this argument. First, is it, as
Sepúlveda claims, an argument sustained by philosophers generally and Aristotle
in particular? Second, is it a credible argument independent of its sources?
As to its Aristotelian credentials, the argument is defective at two key points.
There is first the interpretation of Aristotle on the "natural slave." Slavery that
results solely from war or the strength of the master seems, according to Aristotle,
to be a matter of law, "for the law is a sort of agreement under which things
conquered in war are said to belong to their conquerors." Nonetheless, he goes on,
"many jurists . . . say that it is monstrous if the person powerful enough to use
force, and superior in power, is to have the victim of his force as his slave and
subject; and even among the learned some hold this view, though others hold the
other."49 Those who accept the justice of enslaving prisoners of war typically
contradict themselves, for "there is the possibility that wars may be unjust in their
origin and one would by no means admit that a man that does not deserve slavery
can really be a slave."50
What distinguishes the slave by nature is intellectual capacity; the slave by
nature "participates in reason so far as to apprehend it but not to possess it; for the
animals other than man are subservient not to reason, by apprehending it, but to
feelings."51 Given the limited ability of the slave to implement a rational plan of
practical life, it is beneficial to him and to the master that he be deployed in a
useful manner, which, in the nature of things, "diverges but little from that of
animals."52 To put it bluntly, Aristotle's slave by nature is most closely analogous
to the mentally retarded. As T. J. Saunders puts it, in his recent commentary,
Aristotle seems to be describing "Lennie's intellectual range in Steinbeck's Of
Mice and Men, who can comprehend a train of reasoning but not institute one and
work it out for himself."53 What characterizes Aristotle's natural slave is the level
of defect we identify with those retarded we consider capable of a supervised life
in the mainstream. Saunders is qualifying W. W. Fortenbaugh's earlier conclusion
that "Aristotle's view of slavery is neither psychologically foolish nor morally
repulsive. Of course, there are no natural slaves in the world, so that the view
remains theoretical."54
To call the retarded "natural slaves" strikes the modern reader as, at best,
callous, but Fortenbaugh's brief essay should alert us to the complex status of
Aristotle in the ancient debate.55 Slavery as a fact of life was well established and,
according to Saunders, this section of the Politics is "our main evidence for the
existence of some measure of controversy about it, legal, popular, and
philosophical."56 Not only does Aristotle note the existence of controversy, he
deploys his account of moral psychology to solve the problem by distinguishing
the legitimate from the illegitimate cases of imposed mastery. The natural slave
remains fully human, and, as Fortenbaugh puts it, "Aristotle not only recognises
the capacity of slaves to perceive reason. He also honours it and protests against
withholding reasoned admonition." In this Aristotle criticizes those who would
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treat even the natural slave as nothing more than an animal. "Offering a reason,"
Fortenbaugh suggests:
may be more than pragmatic and self-serving. It may also be giving a
slave his due. For offering a reason involves acknowledging that slaves
can follow reasoned admonition and judge for themselves whether or
not a particular course of action is appropriate. In other words, to offer
slaves reasoned admonition is to invite them to make the sort of decision
they are capable of making.57
This analysis highlights the difference between Aristotle and Sepúlveda. To be a
mature and self-sustaining member of a functioning social order, regardless of its
level of material development or its legal and moral make-up, disqualifies
someone from being a natural slave. This, of course, was the point originally
made by Vitoria, who went on to note, correctly, that Aristotle did not mean:
that it is lawful to seize the goods and lands, and enslave and sell the
persons, of those who are by nature less intelligent. What he meant to
say was that such men have a natural deficiency, because of which they
need others to govern and direct them.58
That he could even less have intended this of whole societies emerges from a full
reading of the text, for immediately following the discussion of slavery Aristotle
offers up a catalogue of the different types of life, from that of the nomad to the
hunter-gatherer, the outlaw and the agriculturalist.59 These are distinct and
independent forms of life, whatever we want to say about their choiceworthiness.
In any case, membership in none of these, of itself, serves to establish natural
slavery.
Once again, a supposedly Aristotelian argument can be shown to have
Ciceronian roots. When Sepúlveda writes that we observe in nature that the
perfect dominate the imperfect and so on, he is echoing Augustine, one of his
favorite authors, who is in turn reporting the argument of Cicero's Republic that:
the rule over provincials is just, precisely because servitude is the
interest of such men, and is established for their welfare when rightly
established; that is, when licence to do wrong is taken away from
wicked men; and that those subdued will be better off, because when not
subdued they were worse off.60
There is much that can be said, and has been said, about this argument. One thing
that assuredly must be said is that it is not by any stretch of the imagination an
"Aristotelian" argument. This can be demonstrated by contrasting it with the
Aristotelian account. Suppose, for example, we encounter a community that has
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adopted, as its way of life, "brigandage. If they direct their attentions toward us
we would be entitled to repel them. And if we found it necessary we could
suppress them. But once they had given up brigandage there would be no justice
in confiscating their legitimately acquired goods. Nor, if we follow Aristotle's
argument, would there be any moral justification for subjecting them to our rule,
even though they might, in some sense, be "better off."
It is not open to Sepúlveda to follow the Aristotelian line of argument,
however, if he wants to retain his conclusion. He needs to identify the Ciceronian
position with that of philosophy generally and discount the thrust of Aristotle's
text if he is going to move from "natural slavery" to the natural empire of the best.
In a passage almost certainly directed against his Dominican protagonists,
Sepúlveda writes:
Look how they deceive you and how different my opinion is, since on
my account the major proof we have for the crudeness, barbarity, and
natural servitude of those people are precisely their public institutions,
which are thoroughly servile and barbaric.62
He specifically instances human sacrifice as the most nefarious of deeds, and
having used the example of the children of Israel extirpating the sacrifices of
Moloch, adds immediately that "God himself declared that this is a matter not
only of divine law, but of natural law and applicable to all nations."63 This, of
course, misses the point altogether. Vitoria had granted that murder of the
innocent was grounds for forcible intervention, and at no point denied that the
Indian practices were barbaric, but none of this justified the claim that "they are
little or no more capable of governing themselves than madmen, or indeed than
wild beasts,"64 and it was only under that condition that there might be a
legitimate title for Spanish dominion.
To Soto and the other legatees of Vitoria, Sepúlveda's claims could scarcely
look like anything other than gross sophistry. In the Apologia drafted for his
Valladolid defence, Sepúlveda would cite not only Vitoria and Aristotle, but
Aquinas, Scotus, John Mair, and a host of other authorities in his favor, provoking
Las Casas to respond in exhausting detail.65 It did not secure publication for his
Démocrates. In his summary of the arguments and counter-arguments Soto
merely records the various points, though the arguments of Las Casas tend to
overwhelm Sepúlveda's.66 In De Iustitia et lure, however, Soto responds to "those
who ask whether Christians, in virtue of the natural right of dominion, may invade
infidel nations which, because of their uncivilized customs, seem to be natural
slaves." The answer, simply put, is no. He writes that:
From this reason alone we do not acquire any right whatsoever to
subjugate them by force, since their inferior condition does not deprive
them of liberty, as though they were chattel slaves or had been made
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prisoners of war. And since liberty is the foundation of dominion, they
retain all of their rights over their goods.
Soto goes further still, rejecting any Aristotelian pedigree for natural slavery as a
license for conquest, noting that:
Aristotle did not locate this form of servitude solely between one nation
and another, but between the individuals in a single city and in a single
family. There are, as a matter of fact, natural slaves among the Christians
of the same city who, nonetheless, may not be stripped of their
possessions, even if they refuse to obey their natural superiors.67
Natural law is clear for Soto, as it had been for Vitoria, that no one holds title
either to the person or goods of another merely in virtue of their level of
civilization or intellectual ability. Soto is even clearer than Aristotle that all
communities are made up of individuals of different intellectual and moral
abilities, but that this does not suffice to deprive the less endowed of their basic
civil rights.
For his part, Sepúlveda believed that Las Casas had engineered his downfall in
Valladolid, writing in the fall of 1551 of the "gossips, artifices, and machinations
with which this astute and able charlatan has managed to thwart justice and
obscure the truth."68 In Sepúlveda's estimation he succeeded in convincing the
more open-minded members of the committee and thus it is important to let his
friends know they should not be upset "by those false rumors that have gotten
round according to which the judgment was not in my favor."69
How is it that, despite his knowledge of Aristotle and Aquinas, and his
immediate awareness of the arguments of the Spanish Dominicans, Sepúlveda
sees them, and sees himself, in such a distinctive light that he has no qualms in
drawing conclusions so manifestly at odds with that earlier Aristotelian
tradition?70 I hinted early on where we should look to answer this question.
Sepúlveda's early schooling at Alcalá was under a curriculum much influenced by
"the patriarch of Spanish Humanism, Antonio de Nebrija."71 Nebrija had studied
in Bologna, played an important role in producing the Polyglot Bible, and in 1492
published the first Spanish grammar, writing in the prologue to Isabella that
"when your Highness has subjected many barbarous peoples and nations of
foreign tongues . . . they will have to accept the laws which the conqueror
imposes on the conquered, and with them our language."72 Although Erasmus
called him Alcalá's "principle ornament," Nebrija was regularly in conflict with
the Dominicans for his insistence that as a philologist he was entitled to establish
the text of Scripture.73 But most important for our purposes, Nebrija was an
advocate of the curricular reforms of Lorenzo Valla. In an important article for
historians of renaissance ethics, Lisa Jardine argues that the "new logical
curriculum devised by humanists like Lorenzo Valla and Rudolph Agricola . . .
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displaced almost entirely the 'genuine' logic of high scholasticism by 1530."
Key to this transformation of logic is the treatment of the syllogism, which
"becomes, within this program, one disputational technique among others, and
indeed, is frequently regarded as too Obvious' an argument strategy to be of
much forensic use."75 Such simple approaches to argument are suspect because
they fail to acknowledge the contested nature of truth claims and the credibility of
non-syllogistic forms of argument connected with the topics literature from
Cicero to Boethius.76 Thus, on Jardine's reading, Valla seeks "an 'undogmatic'
dialectic," that can help to navigate the more uncertain world of Ciceronian
scepticism.77
This Academic scepticism not only predates the Pyrrhonian revival of
Montaigne, it maintains a different moral thrust. "For the Academic sceptic,"
Jardine writes:
it is possible to arbitrate between levels of probability. Cicero believes
that there is a strategy—a distinctive ratio argumentandi of Academic
scepticism—for determining which of two or more alternative beliefs is
the more probable (closer to, though always distinct from truth). The
Academic will then choose to act in ways consistent with the 'more
probable' alternative. The Academic method of rational exploration of
alternatives enables him to make a positive decision about action . . . the
Pyrrhonist leads him uncritically to conform to whatever is politically
and socially expedient (it simply makes no difference.)78
These passages are worth having before us for the way they capture the shape of
Sepúlveda's argument. What seems to be a straightforward natural law argument
fails, by his lights, to acknowledge the difference of cultural and individual
achievement between the Spanish and the New World natives. This is a difference
that remains real, for Sepúlveda, even in those populations that are not involved in
extensive human sacrifice. Thus there must be a more complex relationship to be
established. While scepticism of the Pyrrhonian sort might paralyze political
action, or lead, as in the case of Montaigne himself, to feeling a duty to submit to
the demands of the state,79 the Ciceronian is directed to look at alternative
arguments, even and especially those that do not fit the simple syllogistic model.
This, of course, is precisely what Sepúlveda does when he turns to Cicero's
argument for the rule of the superior. 'Because he is aware of uncertainty (as in
general philosophers are not)," writes Jardine, "the orator is closer to wisdom than
the philosopher, according to Valla: more 'sophos' than the 'philosophos.'"80 The
case is not made less, but more credible, by the dialectical way in which Aristotle
introduces the notion of the natural slave. There is no sure-fire way of determining
who is a natural slave, though the point made by the Philosopher receives a
certain intrinsic probability. Nonetheless, that neither the major nor minor premise
of the practical syllogism—A) Natural slaves should be ruled by superior peoples;
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B) The New World Indians are natural slaves; C) Therefore the New World
Indians should be ruled by superior people—is certain does not mean that the
conclusion does not hold. If there are natural slaves, they probably look more like
the Indians than even our own peasants, pace Vitoria. Given that the argument can
be argued to either conclusion (in utramque partem), the sound academic strategy
is to assemble the collected authorities which can shore up the basic conclusion.
When this conclusion is not necessary, its argument class is the epicheireme, an
"argument in which the link between starting point and conclusion is not
[syllogistic]."81 Rhetorically the most useful arguments here are the inexplicabilia
such as the sorites and the liar's paradox. Their resistance to simple analysis or
solution is taken, by Valla, as evidence for the limits of the syllogism and the
practical need to resolve important questions in alternative ways.
Sepúlveda's use of Cortés and the conquest of Mexico is a case in point. 'The
Mexicans," writes Sepúlveda, were "considered the most prudent and valerous"
among the peoples of the New World. "Moctezurha, their king," he goes on,
commanded a extensive realm, including his capital "situated in a vast lagoon, a
city well defended as much by its location as by its fortifications, similar, so they
say, to Venice, but with almost three times the population."82 Despite these
resources, Cortés was able to cast Moctezuma into chains "before the stupor and
inertia of his citizens, indifferent to the situation and interested in doing anything
other than taking arms to liberate their king."83 "Is this not proof," Sepúlveda
asks, "that they are natural slaves? The fact that some of them seem to have some
talent for various crafts is no argument for human prudence, given that we come
across various animals, like bees and spiders, that make things no human facility
has managed to imitate."84 To maintain that the ease with which Cortés conquered
Tenochtitlan constitutes an argument for the propriety of conquest seems hardy
credible. That the humanity of the natives can be dismissed as no more relevant
than the facility of bugs is surely a landmark of European racism. But when it is
deployed in conjunction with the notion of natural slaves and the propriety of the
rule of the superior it is one more weight on the balance in favor of conquest;
scholastic complaints to the contrary may be ignored. When Sepúlveda concludes,
commending thè just Spaniards who instruct their wards "in upright and humane
customs" and exercising "just dominion, according to nature and at the same time
temperate and humane, over the pacified cities,"85 it is easy to hear in his
"humanis probisque moribus" and "in Populos pacatos iustum pro ipsorum natura
Imperium mite, et humanuni," Anchises's injunction: "Remember, Roman, these
are your arts—to exercise empire over peoples, to impose the habit of peace,
spare the vanquished, and subject the proud by force of arms."86 Like Anchises
reminding the Romans, Sepúlveda exhorts the Spanish to embrace their empire,
because it is just to impose the habit of peace, to spare the downtrodden, and to
subdue the proud. That he did not find the need to quote Virgil directly is no doubt
an effort to avoid repetition; Sepúlveda had used the passage to explicate the
relations between justice and magnanimity in his first Démocrates}1
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In one sense, at least, the imperial apologetics of Sepúlveda did not prevail.
His petition to publish was rejected and the Démocrates Secundus languished
unpublished for over three hundred years. But this limited and local victory
should not be overestimated, for the tradition of Vitoria and Soto, despite its
luminary status in 16th century Spain, would soon be superceded. The analysis of
political justice and international conflict will, in the next century, systematically
sever its connections to the Aristotelian tradition, to be replaced by a legal
paradigm that will ultimately be associated with the Dutch polymath Hugo
Grotius.
The argument between humanists and scholastics, illustrated in microcosm by
Soto and Sepúlveda, illustrates several frequently unnoticed aspects of humanist
influenced ethics in early modern Europe. First, there is the persistent myth of the
Renaissance as a watershed era, marking a shift from the parochialism of the
medieval period to a more cosmopolitan vision. We continue to be reminded of
the fate of Galileo and the even sorrier one of Bruno. But the much remarked
dignity of man asserted by so many humanists is restricted to men of a very
special sort, namely those lucky enough to inherit the classical tradition of
European antiquity. Other peoples, even when they are capable of building cities
that rival the budding metropolises of Europe, have only such dignity as can be
imparted to them by conquering benefactors. It is a commonplace of classical
antiquity that justice is a matter of rendering to each his due, but it is the
traditional Thomists of the second scholastic, hardly precursors of contemporary
liberalism, who insisted that the canons of justice extended even to peoples of
alien religion and less developed material culture. Soto, who stands at the
beginning of the modern Catholic casuistical tradition, is much more committed
to classical standards of political justice, informed by Aristotelian epieikeia, than
the humanists and their heirs, from the "republicans" of the North Atlantic
tradition to the pioneers of the North American west. Andfinally,though this last
is only an earnest of work that needs to be done, we have good reason to believe
that the erosion of the classical standards of argument represented by the
humanism of Sepúlveda paves the way, intellectually at least, for the emergence
of "reasons of state," "the right to conquest," and the "realism" of national interest
under which political ethics continues to labor.
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